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ABSTRACT
This research examines the impact of probable and guaranteed monetary gains and
losses on users’ cybersecurity behavior. It also examines perceptual outcomes such as
threat severity, trust, and fear that are associated with users’ cybersecurity behavior.
Drawing on Prospect Theory in the behavioral economics and decision-making literature,
hypotheses were generated for the research. The hypotheses state that: (i) users are more
willing to engage in risky computer security behavior to avoid a loss than to receive a gain,
(ii) users exhibit a higher tipping point of expected monetary value to receive a gain than
to avoid a loss for engaging in risky computer security behavior, (iii) users are more willing
to engage in risky computer security behavior to avoid a guaranteed loss than a probable
loss, controlling for the amount of expected loss, (iv) users are more willing to engage in
risky computer security behavior to receive a guaranteed gain than a probable gain,
controlling for the amount of expected gain, and (v) users exhibit a higher tipping point of
expected monetary value to engage in risky computer security behavior when presented
with a probable gain (or loss) as compared to a guaranteed gain (or loss). A 2 x 2 betweensubjects experimental design was used to test the hypotheses. The findings indicate that
there is no difference in users’ risky computer security behavior between receiving a gain
and avoiding a loss. However, users exhibit a higher tipping point of expected monetary
value for probable gains and losses than guaranteed gains and losses.

Keywords: Cybersecurity, Prospect Theory, Gain, Loss, Monetary Value.

iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Fiona Fui-Hoon Nah, for
the endless support, guidance, and encouragement. Her patience, knowledge, and vast
experience in research has been exceptional. She helped me from the start till the end of
this research and provided me with all the guidance and help required to complete my
research as well as assisted me with data analysis. It has been a great learning experience
under her guidance.
I would like to express my gratitude to the rest of my thesis committee members,
Dr. Keng Siau and Dr. Richard Hall, for their support, feedback, and suggestions that
helped me to further improve and enhance this research.
I would like to thank Dr. Barry Flachsbart. Ms. Yu-Hsien Chiu, Dr. Steve Liu, Dr.
Chevy Fang, Dr. Sarah Stanley, Dr. Nathan Twyman, Dr. Richard Hall, Dr. Hongxian
Zhang, Dr. Keng Siau, and Dr. Carla Bates for allowing me to recruit subjects for the
experiment in their classes. I would also like to acknowledge the Psychology department
for offering subjects for the experiment.
I would like to express my gratitude to all the Laboratory of Information
Technology and Evaluation (LITE) students, especially to Cooper Broman, Alec Mcdaniel,
Kyle Johnson, Luis Emmanuel Ocampo, Bryan Fox, and Andrew Hackett, for pilot testing
the experimental study and in helping me to set up lab sessions for conducting the
experimental study. I also thank National Science Foundation for the research funding.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and all my friends for having faith in me
and encouraging me throughout my master's degree program.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................... viii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix
SECTION
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................................3
2.1. EFFECT OF USER BEHAVIOR ON INFORMATION SECURITY .............3
2.2. MESSAGE FRAMING ....................................................................................8
3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES .....................................12
3.1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: PROSPECT THEORY...........................12
3.2. HYPOTHESES ...............................................................................................15
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...........................................................................22
4.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ..........................................................................22
4.2. RESEARCH PROCEDURES.........................................................................26
4.3. MEASUREMENT ..........................................................................................28
4.3.1. Importance of Primary Computer .........................................................28
4.3.2. Threat Severity......................................................................................29
4.3.3. Trust ......................................................................................................30
4.3.4. Fear .......................................................................................................31

vi
4.3.5. Tolerance towards Ads .........................................................................31
4.3.6. Manipulation Check .............................................................................32
4.3.7. Demographics and Subject’s Background Questionnaire ....................33
4.3.8. Cybersecurity Awareness Questionnaire ..............................................33
4.3.9. Check Questions ...................................................................................34
4.4. PILOT TESTS ................................................................................................35
5. DATA ANALYSIS ................................................................................................36
5.1. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF SUBJECTS ....................................37
5.2. MEASUREMENT VALIDATION ................................................................39
5.3. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS ..........................43
5.4. CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS............................................................................49
5.5. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR TIPPING POINT .........52
6. DISCUSSIONS.......................................................................................................58
7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ......................................................61
8. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................63
APPENDICES
A. SCENARIO DETAILS ..........................................................................................65
B. EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS .......................................................................67
C. MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONS ...........................................................72
D. CONTROL CONDITION .....................................................................................74
E. QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS PERCEPTUAL OUTCOMES .........................79
F. QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS DEMOGRAPHICS INFORMATION .............82

vii
G. QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS USERS’ CYBERSECURITY
AWARENESS .......................................................................................................84
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................86
VITA ..................................................................................................................................92

viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
Figure 3.1. Prospect Theory ...............................................................................................14
Figure 4.1. Logic of Experimental Scenarios ....................................................................25
Figure 5.1. Interaction between Monetary Polarity and Certainty on Tipping Value .......56

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 2.1. Summary of Literature Review on the Effect of User Behavior on
Information Security ..........................................................................................6
Table 2.2. Summary of Literature Review on Message Framing ......................................10
Table 4.1. Measurement Scale for Importance of Primary Computer ...............................29
Table 4.2. Measurement Scale for Threat Severity............................................................30
Table 4.3. Measurement Scale for Trust ............................................................................30
Table 4.4. Measurement Scale for Fear .............................................................................31
Table 4.5. Measurement Scale for Tolerance towards Ads ...............................................32
Table 4.6. Measurement Scale for Manipulation Check....................................................33
Table 4.7. Measurement Scale for Cybersecurity Awareness ...........................................34
Table 4.8. Measurement Scale for Check Questions .........................................................35
Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects.................................................37
Table 5.2. Results of Factor Analysis (with all measurements) ........................................40
Table 5.3. Results of Factor Analysis (after removing TA3 and IPC2) ............................41
Table 5.4. Results of Reliability Analysis .........................................................................42
Table 5.5. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis for Expected
Monetary Value of $100 ..................................................................................45
Table 5.6. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis for Expected
Monetary Value of $100 in Loss Conditions ....................................................48
Table 5.7. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis for Expected
Monetary Value of $100 in Gain Conditions ....................................................48
Table 5.8. Descriptive Statistics of Chi-Square Analysis ..................................................50

x

Table 5.9. Results of Chi-Square Analysis ........................................................................51
Table 5.10. Descriptive Statistics of the Univariate Analysis of Variance ........................53
Table 5.11. Results of Tests of Between Subjects Effects for Tipping Point ....................54
Table 5.12. Results of Hypothesis Testing ........................................................................57

1
1. INTRODUCTION
The architecture of information security in an organization is dependent on the
users, technology, and cybersecurity policies. Users play a significant role as they interact
with the different components of an organization’s information security architecture. A
study by Sasse et al. (2001) indicates that users are a main cause of intrusions to the
cybersecurity infrastructure in organizations. They found that the actions of users toward
cybersecurity threats act as major causes of malicious intrusions and cybersecurity attacks.
Users are advised to follow standard information security policies framed by the
information security division of their organization, even though many do not, and instead,
they based their actions on personal judgements. Chan and Mubarak (2012) state that the
lack of cybersecurity knowledge is one of the main causes for cybersecurity threats in
organizations. Major cybersecurity vulnerabilities in organizations are mainly caused by
the lack of awareness about information security policies which can lead to attacks such as
phishing, malware, mal-advertising, and drive-by downloads.
Spontaneous actions or misjudgments of users in cybersecurity related scenarios,
such as those related to phishing emails or mal-advertisements, could pose a huge threat to
an organization’s security infrastructure. Chan and Mubarak (2012) found that despite
maintaining a highly secure infrastructure, the lack of security awareness about security
threats and attacks was the main reason for organizational vulnerability to cybersecurity
threats. For example: Users’ lack of awareness of phishing attacks or threats associated
with downloading software from untrusted developers could lead to loss of enterprise data
or data breaches in their organization. Although security awareness can be increased by
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organizing training sessions and by explaining the information security policy to users,
improving security awareness alone does not guarantee that the rules in the organization’s
cybersecurity policy will be followed.
The literature indicates that users are the most vulnerable elements in the
cybersecurity infrastructure of an organization (Siponen, 2000a). Phishing attacks have
been the most common information security threat to organizations and have been the most
challenging attack to evade despite providing training to users. Most of the phishing
attacks that are targeted at users contain a persuasive message to either receive a benefit
(e.g., monetary gain) or overcome a threat (e.g., monetary loss). These messages persuade
users to take a risky cybersecurity action by downloading an uncertified software or visiting
a malicious website to avoid a loss or receive a benefit or gain. Such scenarios, which are
common online threats, warrant the need for further research to understand the impact of
monetary gains and losses on users’ cybersecurity risk taking behavior. For this thesis, we
conducted an experiment to assess the effect of probable and guaranteed monetary gains
and losses on users’ behavior in the context of cybersecurity.
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related literature.
Section 3 presents the theoretical foundation and hypotheses. Section 4 describes the
research methodology, design, and procedure. Section 5 provides the data analysis for the
research. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 provides the limitations and directions
for future research. Section 8 provides the conclusion for the thesis.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on the effect of user behavior on
information security as well as on message framing in the context of information security.

2.1. EFFECT OF USER BEHAVIOR ON INFORMATION SECURITY
Various processes for managing cybersecurity, such as the standardized framework
for implementing security policies, exist in organizations. In this section, past empirical
studies that are related to factors influencing user behavior in the context of cybersecurity
will be reviewed. Siponen (2000a) states that users are the most vulnerable targets of
cybersecurity threats in an organization. His study indicates that end users in organizations
do not follow security guidelines, leading to cybersecurity threats such as phishing,
malware, and other attacks.
Siponen (2000b) also stresses that even though the importance of the role of
motivation in cybersecurity is largely understood, it is not practiced effectively in
organizations. A review of the existing literature also indicates that risk perception is a
factor influencing users’ course of actions. In the computer security domain, Farahmand
and Spafford (2013) state that individuals within an organization (i.e., insiders) may be
deterred from undesirable computer security behaviors by reducing their motivation to
misbehave and conveying that attempts to misbehave will present too much risk. As Vardi
and Weitz (2004) noted in their research, the role of the employees is significant for the
information security infrastructure of the organization, and it is very important for
employees to adhere to the organizational policies to avoid security threats. Shoshitaishvili
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et al. (2014) analyzed a team competition in cybersecurity challenges. Tasks were used to
present different levels of risks to the teams, and it was found that teams were willing to
engage in riskier tasks if those tasks provided higher rewards, measured in terms of
competition points. In other words, the teams were willing to engage in riskier behavior
when they perceived a higher level of reward because of their actions. A study which was
based on Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) states that users’ behavior in information
security can be predicted using their self-efficacy (LaRose et al., 2008). Self-efficacy is
defined as a belief that a user possesses towards achieving or accomplishing certain goals
(LaRose et al., 2008). A survey-based research by Woon et al. (2005) indicates that
perceived severity, response cost, perceived susceptibility and self-efficacy have an effect
on cybersecurity behavior of users (Woon et al., 2005). Perceived severity refers to one’s
understanding of the severity of the consequences of an event. The authors found that users
decide on their choice of action based on perceived severity and perceived vulnerability.
Perceived vulnerability is defined as one’s assessment of the probability of a threatening
event and its effect on oneself. Response cost refers to perceived opportunity costs (which
can be either money, time, or effort) that the user experiences due to adoption of the
recommended behavior. The research study by Pahnila et al. (2007) on user behavior in
cybersecurity considers various other factors that include sanctions, information quality
and rewards to understand the possible effects of these factors on the cybersecurity
behavior of users (Pahnila et al., 2007).
Maddux and Rogers (1983) have shown that coping response has a positive
influence towards behavioral intents, which can result in implementation of the
recommended compliance behavior. Coping response refers to the behavioral responses
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or actions that people take to overcome stressful situations (Maddux and Rogers, 1983).
Various studies in the literature have assessed the effect of fear appeal on cybersecurity
behavior of users when they are in a high-risk environment. Johnston and Warkentin
(2010) found that fear appeal could be used to persuade users to alter their cybersecurity
behavior in order to avoid cybersecurity threats and risks. The behavior of users also
depends on their self-efficacy and perceived threat vulnerability (Johnston & Warkentin,
2010).
In a review of the literature by Lebek et al. (2013), they summarized the reasons
for users’ security responses based on the most frequently applied theories in behavioral
sciences: Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) / Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), General
Deterrence Theory (GDT), Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), and Technology
Acceptance Model (TAM). Aurigemma & Panko (2010) found that the intentions of a user
to comply with information security policies (ISP) depends on his/her own evaluation and
belief towards the process.
Aurigemma and Panko (2010) also found that the greater the notion of control the
user develops over his or her actions, the greater is the intention to comply with the ISP of
the organization. Based on GDT, the research in criminal justice by D’Arcy et al. (2009)
indicates that the possible repercussions of a decision, such as perceived certainty of
sanctions or the loss that a user might face, influences his/her decision on ISP compliance.
In a study based on PMT by Bulgurcu et al. (2010), they found that a user’s attitude towards
the information security policies of an organization is often influenced by two factors,
threat appraisal and coping appraisal, where the user analyzes the threats involved and
adopts the technology to prevent cybersecurity threats.
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Past literature also suggests that even though users possess prior knowledge about
cybersecurity threats and the suitable recommended actions, in some cases, the users take
risky cybersecurity actions for benefits or rewards (Lee & Kozar, 2005; Stanton et al.,
2005; Sasse et al., 2001). The Table 2.1 provides the summary of existing literature on the
effect of user behavior on information security.

Table 2.1. Summary of Literature Review on the Effect of User Behavior on
Information Security
Reference
Aurigemma & Panko
(2010)

Bulgurcu et al. (2010)

D’Arcy et al. (2009)

Description
The authors found that
users’ intentions to comply
with information security
policies of the organization
depends on his/her own
evaluation and belief
towards the process.
The authors found that
users’ attitude is affected
by the cost associated with
the consequences of his/her
compliance/noncompliance behavior.
The authors analyzed the
possible repercussions of a
decision such as the
perceived uncertainty of
sanctions or the loss that a
user might face and its
influence on his/her
decision on the ISP
compliance.

Theory
Not Applicable

Protection Motivation
Theory

General Deterrence Theory
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Table 2.1. Summary of Literature Review on the Effect of User Behavior on Information
Security (cont.)
Reference
Johnston & Warkentin
(2010)

LaRose et al. (2008)

Lebek et al. (2013)

Pahnila et al. (2007)

Shoshitaishvili et al.
(2014)

Description
The authors proposed that
fear appeals affect users’
security behavioral intents,
but the effect is not
constant.
The authors found that
users’ cybersecurity
behavior mainly depends
on social connections and
self-efficacy.
The authors identified the
reasons for users’ security
responses and summarized
them using four main
behavioral theories:
General Deterrence
Theory, Technology
Acceptance Model, Theory
of Planned Behavior, and
Protection Motivation
Theory.
The authors found that
attitude, normative beliefs,
and habits influence ISP
compliance intention, and
threat appraisal and
facilitating conditions
influence attitude toward
compliance.
The authors analyzed
users’ cybersecurity
behavior through a
competition in which teams
competed in cybersecurity
challenges. The study
observed that the teams
were willing to engage in
riskier behavior when they
perceived a higher level of
reward because of their
actions.

Theory
Fear Appeal Theory, and
Protection Motivation
Theory
Protection Motivation
Theory and Social
Cognitive Theory
Theory of Reasoned
Action, Theory of Planned
Behavior, Technology
Acceptance Model, and
General Deterrence Theory

General Deterrence
Theory, Protection
Motivation Theory

Not Applicable
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Table 2.1. Summary of Literature Review on the Effect of User Behavior on Information
Security (cont.)
Reference
Siponen (2000a)

Woon et al. (2005)

Description
The author analyzed
different methods to reduce
user related faults in
information systems
security and examined the
strengths and weaknesses
of these methods.
The authors found that
users’ choice of action was
based on perceived severity
and perceived
vulnerability.

Theory
Theory of Planned
Behavior, Technology
Acceptance Model, Theory
of Reasoned Action, and
General Deterrence Theory
Protection Motivation
Theory

2.2. MESSAGE FRAMING
The literature has also examined the effect of positively and negatively framed
messages on users’ behavior (Aaker & Lee, 2001; Shiv, Edell & Payne, 2004). Various
studies have also been conducted to understand users’ behavior and decision-making
process based on Prospect Theory which states that the outcomes of an individual can be
influenced by the way the message is framed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Users
generally select their choices by considering personal gains or losses conveyed in the
message. Prospect theory states that users tend to perceive losses more than gains, which
is also known as loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). Researchers explain loss
aversion as a behavior observed in people, where people try to avoid a loss in scenarios
where there is a risk involved (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). The effect of message
framing across various decision-making perspectives has been studied from financial and
socio psychological standpoints, based on funds and social predicaments in a research
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study by Brewer and Kramer (1986). Similarly, in the cybersecurity domain, researchers
have studied the impact of message framing on reliant variables covering threat awareness,
as stated in a research study by Lee and Aaker (2004). Message framing also includes
highlighting the advantages and the constructive aspects of selecting a choice or the
disadvantages of not selecting a choice (Aaker & Lee, 2001). Protection Motivation Theory
(PMT) based research studies related to health have been conducted to understand what
type of promotional messages would persuade a user, thereby preventing the user from
taking an action when confronted with a risk. Pechmann et al. (2003) examined the effects
of framing on decision-making behavior. Their study analyzed how antismoking messages
in a wellbeing context could spur a person when posed by a risk involving the harmful
effects of smoking. They found that negatively framed anti-smoking messages had more
impact on people compared to positively framed messages
Past research also suggests that users tend to be more inclined towards pursuing
risks, when they are presented with a case of financial losses which could affect the
financial budget of the organization (Beebe et al., 2014). Beebe et al. (2014) surveyed
industry professionals to understand their decision-making processes when responding to
information security budget requests. The findings suggest that decision makers may be
more inclined to take risks when presented with information security budget requests that
emphasize the financial losses (i.e., negative framing) that will impact the organization if
the budget requests are not met (Beebe et al., 2014).
The literature also indicates that users tend to show a high security behavior when
they are given a message that focuses on the benefits of performing a secure action, rather
than the negative outcomes of not performing it (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). From the
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findings of the study, the researchers found that users may perform cybersecurity actions
depending on how the potential gains or potential losses that would result from the actions
are presented to them (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010).
Research studies in the literature have examined the impact of message framing on
various reliant variables covering intents (Block & Keller, 1995) and threat awareness (Lee
& Aaker, 2003). Hence, we expect the cybersecurity behavior of users to be influenced by
the way messages are framed (LaRose et al., 2008). Table 2.2 provides a summary of the
literature on message framing.

Table 2.2. Summary of Literature Review on Message Framing
Reference
Aaker & Lee (2001), Shiv
et al. (2004)

Beebe et al. (2014)

Description
Impact of positively
expressed vs. negatively
expressed messages on
users’ decision making.
The authors found that
negatively expressed
messages had a significant
impact on people’s
decision making compared
to positively framed
messages.
The authors examined the
effect of negative framing
of messages on users and
how users tend to be more
inclined towards pursuing
risks when presented with
a case of financial losses.

Theory
Prospect Theory

Prospect Theory
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Table 2.2. Summary of Literature Review for Message Framing (cont.)
Reference
LaRose et al. (2008)

Pechmann, et al. (2003)

Tversky & Kahneman
(1984)

Tversky & Kahneman
(1986)

Description
The authors highlight
individuals’ responsibilities
in a message to examine
and optimize the users’
cybersecurity behavior.
The authors found that
users’ cybersecurity
behavioral intentions can
be further swayed by
applying framing in
messages.
The authors examined how
antismoking messages in
the wellbeing context could
spur a person when posed
by a risk involving the
harmful effects of
smoking.
The authors studied the
impact of monetary losses
and gains on users’
behavior and found that
users’ perceived losses
more seriously than gains.
The authors analyzed the
impact of message framing
on individuals’ behavior
and their choices.

Theory
Protection Motivation
Theory and Social
Cognitive Theory

Protection Motivation
Theory

Prospect Theory

Prospect Theory
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3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES
To understand the cybersecurity behavior of users in monetary gain and loss
scenarios, we draw on the Prospect Theory, which is one of the most widely used theories
in economics. Prospect Theory is based on the economic principles of decision making
under uncertainty (Fishburn, 1970; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

3.1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: PROSPECT THEORY
Prospect Theory provides insights about the decisions people make when they are
under a state of threat or uncertainty, and where they are also aware of the probability of
the outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). The choices that are made by people are based
on their acumen, and the acumen which people perceive is based on the relative evaluation
of the external factors of the world. Making choices are hard, and can be difficult for users
who are confronted with risks, as it is difficult to predict the outcomes with certainty.
Making choices can be strenuous from a user’s perspective.
The process of decision-making by applying quantified risks as a metric involves
two steps (McDermott, 1991). In the first step, the users assess risks by evaluating the
vulnerabilities and by examining existing and possible hazards. The second step is about
the influence on decision making, caused by the way in which information is presented or
framed (McDermott, 1991).
Prospect theory mainly focuses on the process of decision making and how
confined those decisions are. Decision-making based on prospect theory involves two
phases. In the first phase, people assess the possible levels of risks involved in their given
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choices based on their reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). The impact due to
this subjective assessment is known as framing, in which a prospect is subjectively
estimated as either a loss or a gain. This phase involves the organization and reformulation
of all the possible options to simplify the process of evaluation and decision making
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). After this phase, which involves the framing of all the
alternatives based on the given conditions, each of the possible alternatives is assessed
based on how they are perceived (either as gains or as losses). The choice with the highest
benefit is then selected by the user. During the second phase, judgements made are loss
aversive, i.e., people are more concerned about losses. The loss averse behavior indicates
that losses are perceived stronger than gains (Verendel, 2009). Prospect theory indicates
that users perceive a loss to be more substantial than a benefit of the same quantity (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1986). Prospect theory also explains loss aversion, which suggests that users
are more likely to react to losses than gains.
Tversky and Kahneman (1986), explain the outcome of people’s decisions based
on gains and losses in a value function. Figure 3.1 depicts the value function with value
on the vertical axis and outcome on the horizontal axis. If we observe from the reference
point (which is the point of origin of the axes), the value function in the loss condition is
different from the value function in the gain condition. The value function for the loss
condition shows a deeper curve, whereas the value function for the gain condition flattens
horizontally at a smaller value.
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Figure 3.1. Prospect Theory

The value function is represented as a convex function for losses and a concave
function for gains. It shows that people are more likely to seek risks to avoid losses, which
is explained as loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). This loss aversion behavior
indicates that people are more likely to take risks to avoid or minimize losses. The value
function for the gain condition is a concave function, and it becomes parallel to the
horizontal axis (outcome) after a certain value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). The value
function for the gain condition shows that it curves at a lower value compared to the value
function for the loss condition. Hence, people tend to be less risk seeking (i.e., more risk
averse) when presented with a condition of receiving a gain than avoiding a loss (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1986).
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) observed that the value function reaches a state of
saturation or a state of diminishing sensitivity after reaching a certain value in the case of
gains and losses as depicted in Figure 3.1. This point of saturation or diminishing
sensitivity in the value function is the flattening of the value function in both the gain and
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loss conditions. This point of diminishing sensitivity shows the change in the sensitivity
of monetary benefits and losses observed among people.

3.2. HYPOTHESES
Prospect theory, which was first introduced in behavioral economics, plays an
important role for generating the hypotheses for this research. Prospect theory states that
people perceive losses more seriously than benefits of the same amount (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1984).
Prospect theory explains behavior of people as loss aversion, where people try to
minimize losses, even though the probability of experiencing losses is small. For example,
Tversky & Kahneman (1984) conducted an experiment where the subjects were given a
scenario where they had to make a decision regarding an outbreak of a disease that was
estimated to kill 600 people. The options were: (A) 100% chance that 400 people will die,
and (B) There is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 people
will die. 78% of the subjects chose option B over option A, which indicates that there is a
preference towards the possible prevention of losing all 600 people rather than losing only
200 people with certainty. The results from this experiment indicates that people were more
willing to take risks to avoid a loss. This risk seeking behavior was not observed when
people were presented with scenarios involving a benefit or gain, as people show a risk
adverse behavior when presented with scenarios involving a benefit compared to scenarios
involving a loss.
Based on people’s risk seeking behavior to avoid losses from prospect theory, this
research applies the findings from prospect theory to study the behavior of users in a
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scenario involving a cybersecurity risk. In cybersecurity related scenarios, the process of
decision making for the users becomes even more complex as the users’ decisions can be
influenced by both the scenarios and framing of messages. Based on prospect theory, users
are more likely to take a risky cybersecurity action to avoid a monetary loss as compared
to receive a monetary gain. Hence, based on prospect theory, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H1: Users are more willing to engage in risky computer security behavior to avoid
a loss than to receive a gain.

In this research, we draw on the principle underlying the value function (see Figure
3.1) from prospect theory in the field of economics by Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and
apply it to cybersecurity scenarios. To understand user behavior in a cybersecurity
scenario, we propose to examine the point at which users show a different cybersecurity
behavior in both the gain and loss scenarios. We call this point the tipping point based on
the expected monetary value. Hence, the tipping point refers to the expected monetary
value below which users will not be risk seeking. In other words, the tipping point is the
maximum expected monetary value in which users show a risk averse behavior and are
willing to take risks. Prospect theory also explains that people tend to be more concerned
about damage or monetary losses than monetary benefits and that people show a risk
seeking behavior to avoid a loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). We propose that based on
prospect theory, users show a change in their cybersecurity behavior at a lower value to
avoid a monetary loss than to receive a monetary gain, as they perceive the impact of a loss
more seriously than a gain of the same monetary value. Similarly, in the case of a monetary
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gain, users show a change in their cybersecurity behavior at a higher value than the case of
a monetary loss, as the findings of prospect theory show that people are more risk averse
when they are experiencing a gain or a benefit.
Hence, based on the explanation provided by prospect theory on the value function,
user behavior, and how the user behavior changes based on expected monetary value, we
propose the following hypothesis:
H2: Users exhibit a higher tipping point of expected monetary value to engage in
risky computer security behavior when receiving a gain than avoiding a loss.

Tversky and Kahneman (1986) explain that the value function is normally concave
above the reference point when there is a gain and the value function is often convex below
the reference point in the case of a loss (see Figure 3.1). Prospect theory also suggests that
the value function is steeper for losses than for gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). This
steepness in the convex function shows the loss aversion observed among people when
given a loss condition.
Prospect theory also indicates that the way in which people perceive guaranteed
conditions is different from the way in which people perceive probable conditions (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1986). When presented with conditions that have a 50% probability of a
loss, it was observed that majority of people perceive it as a 50% probability of not
incurring a loss. It shows the risk seeking behavior of people as explained in prospect
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Based on findings from prospect theory, people tend
to prefer a probable loss over a guaranteed or certain monetary loss even when controlling
for the expected value of the loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). This behavior is due to
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the way in which the conditions are perceived. Individuals tend to perceive the probable
factor more seriously than the guaranteed factor in the loss scenario, which is in line with
loss aversion in prospect theory. In perceiving the probable factor, people tend to give
importance to the chance for a significant loss in the outcome. This probability for a change
in the outcome associated with a monetary loss takes precedence when compared to a
guaranteed monetary loss even though the expected monetary value is the same (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1986). The following example illustrates this loss averse behavior.
Example: In addition to whatever people own, they have been given $2000, and
they were asked to choose between two choices: i) A 50% probability that they lose $1000,
and ii) A 100% probability that they lose $500. For the above condition, 69% of them
chose the first choice of taking a 50% chance of losing $1000 (Tversky & Kahneman,
1986). In the example, the expected monetary value in the probable and guaranteed
conditions have the same expected outcome, as 50% of $1000 is $500, and 100% of $500
is also $500. The findings suggest that individuals preferred the risk seeking option because
they saw an opportunity for change (i.e., avoid a huge loss) in the outcome as compared to
the outcome with certainty, even though the expected monetary value outcome remains the
same in both the conditions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Prospect theory indicates that
users perceive a probable loss to be more substantial than a certain or guaranteed loss of
the same quantity, i.e., probable damage is favored over a guaranteed damage (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986).
Based on prospect theory, when users are presented with a scenario involving a
risky cybersecurity choice, they would rather face a probable loss over a guaranteed loss
when controlling for the expected loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In other words, users
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are more willing to take a risky cybersecurity action to avoid a guaranteed loss over a
probable loss when the amount of expected loss is controlled due to their preference for
experiencing a probable loss over a guaranteed loss. Hence, users show risk seeking
behavior, as they tend to perceive the probability of experiencing a monetary loss more
importantly as the probability of not experiencing or avoiding a monetary loss. Hence,
based on prospect theory, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H3: Users are more willing to engage in risky computer security behavior to avoid
a guaranteed loss than a probable loss, controlling for the amount of expected loss.

In assessing prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky observed a risk averse
behavior among the participants of their experiments when they were presented with
scenarios involving a benefit or gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). People prefer the
choice with a higher probability of gaining a monetary benefit of a smaller value to the
choice with a lesser probability of gaining a monetary benefit of higher value, with the
expected utility controlled (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). The following example from a
study by Tversky and Kahneman (1986) illustrates human decision-making preference in
the gain scenario.
Example: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $1000, and the
participants were asked to choose between two choices: i) There is a 50% probability of
getting $1000 and, ii) There is a 100% probability of getting $500. 70% of the participants
chose the second choice, thereby being risk averse when experiencing a gain (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986). It is explained in prospect theory that individuals show a risk averse
behavior by preferring a guaranteed gain to a probable gain, even when the expected
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monetary value is the same, given that they prefer receiving $500 with certainty, rather
than taking the risk of either getting $1000 or not getting $1000.
As explained in the above example that is based on prospect theory, people prefer
receiving a monetary benefit of a smaller amount with certainty to the probability of
receiving a larger monetary benefit (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Based on the findings
from prospect theory and applying it in a cybersecurity scenario, we propose that users are
more likely to carry out a risky cyber security action to obtain a monetary benefit or gain
with certainty as compared to a probability of receiving a monetary benefit with the same
expected gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Hence, people are risk adverse when faced
with gains. Based on prospect theory, we propose the following hypothesis:
H4: Users are more willing to engage in risky computer security behavior to receive
a guaranteed gain than a probable gain, controlling for the amount of expected gain.

Based on prospect theory and Figure 3.1 that shows the value function, the tipping
point value (monetary value above which the user would perform a cybersecurity action to
prevent a loss or receive a gain) between probable and guaranteed gains and losses is
compared. By applying prospect theory in a cybersecurity context, we expect users to
prefer a probable monetary loss to a guaranteed monetary loss with the same expected loss
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In other words, users’ preference is to avoid a guaranteed
loss over a probable loss of the same expected loss. As users prefer a probable monetary
loss to a guaranteed monetary loss, they will show a change in their risk-taking behavior
(tipping point) at a higher monetary value in the probable monetary loss condition as
compared to the guaranteed monetary loss condition. Similarly, when presented with
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guaranteed and probable gain scenarios that control for the amount of expected gain, users
are more likely to take a risky cybersecurity action in the guaranteed monetary gain
condition as compared to the probable monetary gain condition because users are risk
adverse with gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Hence, in both the gain and loss
contexts, we expect users to show a change in their cybersecurity behavior (tipping point)
at a higher monetary value in the probable condition than the guaranteed condition
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). To hypothesize the difference in the tipping point between
guaranteed and probable conditions, we propose the following:
H5: Users are more willing to engage in a risky computer security behavior at a
higher tipping point of expected monetary value in the probable condition as compared to
the guaranteed condition in both gain and loss scenarios.
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section covers the experimental design, research procedures, measurement,
and pilot tests to assess the hypotheses proposed in section 3.

4.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A 2 X 2 between-subjects experimental design was used to test the hypotheses: H1,
H2, H3, H4 and H5. The first factor is Monetary Polarity, which has two levels, Gain and
Loss. The second factor is Certainty, which has two levels, Guaranteed (100%) and
Probable (50%). Hence, the four experimental conditions are: (i) Guaranteed Gain, (ii)
Guaranteed Loss, (iii) Probable Gain, and (iv) Probable Loss. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. To assess the tipping point of each
subject in their assigned experimental condition, a repeated measure within the 2 X 2
design was used. This repeated measure was operationalized using Expected Monetary
Value of the gain or loss in the four conditions. Controlling for Expected Monetary Value,
the starting value was set to $100 in all four conditions. Hence, the guaranteed conditions
(Guaranteed Gain and Guaranteed Loss) were associated with a starting value of $100 gain
and loss, and the probable conditions (Probable Gain and Probable Loss) were associated
with a starting value of a 50% chance of a gain or loss of $200, resulting in an expected
value of a gain or loss of $100. In other words, the reason behind setting the starting value
at $100 for guaranteed conditions and $200 for probable conditions is that the Expected
Monetary Value is equal to $100 in both cases, since the probable conditions have a 50%
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chance of gaining or losing $200. In other words, 50% chance of gaining/losing $200 will
have an Expected Monetary Value of 0.5 * $200 = $100.
If the subject indicates that he or she will not take the cybersecurity risk in the first
scenario (i.e., expected monetary value of $100), then the tipping point is $100 (or more).
If the subject indicates that he or she will take the cybersecurity risk in the first scenario,
then scenarios with expected monetary values of $75, $50 and $25 follow until the subject
chooses not to take the cybersecurity risk. In other words, if the subject indicates that he
or she will not take the cybersecurity risk at one of the three expected monetary values of
$75, $50 or $25, we have identified the tipping point to be in the range of $75-$100 (if the
subject indicates so when presented with an expected monetary value of $75), $50-$75 (if
the subject indicates so when presented with an expected monetary value of $50) or $25$50 (if the subject indicates so when presented with an expected monetary value of $25).
If the subject indicates that he or she will take the cybersecurity risk at all three levels of
expected monetary values of $75, $50, and $25, then the tipping point falls in the range of
$0-$25.
In the case where the tipping point was found to be in the range of $75-$100, $50$75 or $25-50, we increase the expected monetary value by $5 in the next four scenarios
until the subject indicates that he or she will take the cybersecurity risk. If the tipping point
falls in the interval of $0-$25, four possible scenarios with expected monetary values of
$5, $10, $15, and $20 are to be presented until the subject indicates that he or she will take
the cybersecurity risk, which suggests that the tipping point was reached. Finally, the
subject will also be asked if he or she will take the cybersecurity risk when expected

24
monetary value of zero is encountered. If the subject indicates yes, the tipping point is
zero. Figure 4.1 shows the logic and ordering of the scenarios presented to the subjects.
Unless the tipping point is zero, it is computed as the average of the $5 interval
below the lowest (non-zero) expected monetary value in which a risky cybersecurity action
was undertaken. If a subject indicates that he or she will take the cybersecurity risk at the
expected monetary value of $100 and then indicates that he or she will not take the
cybersecurity risk at expected monetary value $95, then the average in the $5 interval is
$97.5, which is the tipping point. The series of scenarios presented to the subjects end with
a scenario with expected monetary value of zero.
The cybersecurity risk in the experiment involved downloading a software
application called “Ad-hoc Pro” from an uncertified developer. This software application
provides an ad free browsing experience that no software in the market can provide.
However, because the developer is uncertified, there is a risk involved in downloading the
software application.
Based on the monetary value gain or loss scenario posed to the subjects, they made
a decision whether to download or not download the “Ad-Free Pro” software application.
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Figure 4.1. Logic of Experimental Scenarios
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4.2. RESEARCH PROCEDURES
The experimental study was conducted in the computer labs at the Missouri
University of Science and Technology. The opening scenario that was presented to all
subjects at the beginning of the experiment is shown in Appendix A. The scenario indicates
that all subjects were presented with $200 free credits and were asked to download an adfree software application from an uncertified developer. Subjects were then presented with
a series of scenarios and had to made decisions on whether to download or not download
the software application based on the monetary condition presented in each scenario.
Appendix B shows the first scenario associated with each of the four experimental
conditions: Guaranteed Gain, Guaranteed Loss, Probable Gain, and Probable Loss. The
experimental scenarios were operationalized based on the Expected Monetary Value of
$100 for the first scenario. The subjects were presented with scenarios in guaranteed or
probable condition involving either a monetary gain or monetary loss and asked to make a
choice to download or not download the application from the uncertified developer. In each
scenario, validation check questions were included to make sure subjects understood the
given scenario before making the decision of downloading or not downloading the “AdFree Pro” application from an uncertified developer. The subjects were also asked to
explain their rationale behind choosing to download or not download the application. The
subjects were then presented with manipulation check questions as shown in Appendix C,
and that were used to check if the subjects had understood and paid attention to the scenario
details.
After answering the manipulation check questions (Appendix C), the subjects were
presented with a control scenario based on the same experimental condition and asked
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whether they would download the “Ad-Free Pro” application from the uncertified
developer from whom the subject had received $200 worth of free Amazon shopping
credits. The control condition is provided in the Appendix D. It involved no monetary
polarity (no loss or gain). The control condition is used in this experimental study to
validate the certainty and authenticity of the subject’s choices made in all the experimental
scenarios.
After completing the control condition question, the subjects were presented with
a questionnaire with questions on a 7-point Likert’s scale to examine the perceptual
outcomes of the subjects (Threat Severity, Trust, Importance of Primary Computer, and
Tolerance towards Ads).
The questionnaire to examine the perceptual outcomes of the subjects is provided
in Appendix E. The questions were randomized and presented by the system to all the
subjects to prevent any ordering effect.
After completing the questionnaire to examine the perceptual outcomes, the
subjects were presented with the background and demographics questionnaire, which is
provided in Appendix F. The questionnaire consists of questions examining the subject’s
gender, age, race, internet usage and software download frequency. After completing the
background and the demographics questionnaire, the subjects were presented with a cybersecurity awareness questionnaire which is provided in Appendix G. The cybersecurity
awareness questionnaire is adopted from a cybersecurity awareness survey by Manjak
(2006). The questions in the cybersecurity awareness questionnaire were also randomized
by the system to prevent any ordering effect. The subjects were provided with a comments
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section after completing the cybersecurity awareness questionnaire, where they could share
their comments or feedback about participating in this experimental study.

4.3. MEASUREMENT
After completing the experimental conditions, the subjects were presented with a
post-study questionnaire, which was used to assess if the subject was currently using
his/her primary computer, if the subject stores all his important files in the cloud, and
perceptual outcomes associated with user actions, i.e., importance of primary computer,
fear, threat severity and, trust. The post-study questionnaire included manipulation check
questions and other check questions, to validate each subject’s understanding of the
questions and attention to these questions. The demographics and the information about
the subject’s understanding of cybersecurity were recorded using measurement items in the
post-study questionnaire.
4.3.1. Importance of Primary Computer. The importance of the primary
computer scale was developed by the researcher and used to assess the importance that the
subject possesses for his/her primary computer. This measurement is used to examine and
understand the decision of subjects to download or not download the “Ad-Free Pro”
application. To collect the responses from the subjects, a 7-point Likert scale (strongly
disagree=1 to strongly agree=7) was used. The measurement items used in this research
study to examine the importance of primary computer among users is explained in Table
4.1.
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Table 4.1. Measurement Scale for Importance of Primary Computer
Measurement Items
(IPC1) I have important files stored on my primary computer.
Importance of

(IPC2) My primary computer is valuable to me.

Primary
Computer
(IPC)

(IPC3) The data on my primary computer is important to me.
(IPC4) I cannot afford to lose the files on my primary computer.
(IPC5) I will not risk the security of my primary computer.
(IPC6) My primary computer is very important to me.

4.3.2. Threat Severity. Threat severity refers to the level of severity of the threat
perceived by the subject regarding downloading a software from the Internet. The
measurement items (see Table 4.2), were adopted from Johnston and Warkentin (2010) in
which they explain that the factor, threat severity, assesses the degree of danger
associated with a cybersecurity threat. To collect the responses from the subjects, a 7point Likert scale (strongly disagree=1 to strongly agree=7) was used.
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Table 4.2. Measurement Scale for Threat Severity (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010)
Measurement Items
(TS1) If my computer were infected by malware because of
downloading the "Ad-Free Pro" application, it would be
Threat
Severity (TS)

severe.
(TS2) If my computer were infected by malware because of
downloading the "Ad-Free Pro" application, it would be
serious.
(TS3) If my computer were infected by malware because of
downloading the "Ad-Free Pro" application, it would be
significant.

4.3.3. Trust. Trust is personality trait which is defined as a person’s inclination to
believe in an action (Freed, 2014). The measurement items (see Table 4.3) for trust were
adopted from Freed (2014), to assess the level of trust that an individual user possessed
on a software provider. To collect the responses from the subjects, a 7-point Likert scale
(strongly disagree=1 to strongly agree=7) was used.

Table 4.3. Measurement Scale for Trust (Freed, 2014)
Measurement Items
(T1) I believe the "Ad-Free Pro" application is a trustworthy
application.
Trust (T)

(T2) I trust the vendor of the "Ad-Free Pro" application.
(T3) I trust the "Ad-Free Pro" application.
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4.3.4. Fear. Fear is defined as an emotion that arises due to an anxiety of believing
something or someone could cause harm (Freed, 2014). The measurement of the fear factor
was adopted from Freed (2014) to assess the level of fear possessed by the subjects on
downloading “Ad-Free Pro” application from the Internet (see Table 4.4). The study by
Freed (2014) explains that fear is caused by past incidents related to cybersecurity threats.
To collect the responses from the subjects, a 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree=1 to
strongly agree=7) was used.

Table 4.4. Measurement Scale for Fear (Freed, 2014)
Measurement Items
(F1) I was worried about downloading the “Ad-Free Pro” application.
Fear(F)

(F2) I was concerned about downloading the “Ad-Free Pro”
application.
(F3) I experienced fear when deciding if I should download the
“Ad-Free Pro” application.

4.3.5. Tolerance towards Ads. Tolerance towards ads was used to examine the
subject’s ability to bear with the interruptions caused due to ads while browsing the
Internet. Tolerance towards ads was measured in this experimental study to assess if there
is an effect of the subject’s tolerance towards ads on his/her decision to download or not
download the “Ad-Free Pro” application. The researcher developed the measurement items
for tolerance towards Ads (see Table 4.5). To collect the responses from the subjects, a 7point Likert scale (strongly disagree=1 to strongly agree=7) was used.
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Table 4.5. Measurement Scale for Tolerance towards Ads
Measurement Items
(TA1) I hate having ads on my primary computer.
Tolerance
towards Ads

(TA2) Having ads on my primary computer is fine with me.
(TA3) I am bothered by ads on my primary computer.

(TA)
(TA4) I like to have ads on my primary computer.
(TA5) I do not mind having ads on my primary computer.
(TA6) I do not want ads on my primary computer.

4.3.6. Manipulation Check. The manipulation check questions assessed the
understanding of the subjects about the monetary gain or loss condition that the subject
experienced as well as the certainty level associated with the gain or loss. The researcher
developed the measurement items for the manipulation check (see Table 4.6). The items
were included to assess the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations and to analyze
if the subjects had understood the scenario details and the experimental conditions.
Subjects answered the first manipulation check question (see Table 4.6) on a Gain / Loss
binary scale and answered the second manipulation check question by selecting the
probability (0%, 50% and 100%) among the options given to them.

33
Table 4.6. Measurement Scale for Manipulation Check
Measurement Items
(MC1) In the scenarios above, on downloading the “Ad-Free Pro”
software, you experience a _________
Manipulation
Check

(MC2) In the scenarios above, on downloading the software, what
are your chances of experiencing a gain/loss?

4.3.7. Demographics and Subject’s Background Questionnaire. The survey
questionnaire to assess the subject’s demographic and background information (Appendix
F) contains items on the subject’s demographics that include gender, age, education level,
and occupation. The questionnaire also includes items to assess the Internet usage and the
frequency of software downloads from the Internet.
4.3.8. Cybersecurity Awareness Questionnaire. The measurement items for
cybersecurity awareness (Table 4.7), that are provided in Appendix G were adopted from
a cybersecurity awareness survey by Manjak (2006).

The cybersecurity awareness

questionnaire was included in this experimental study to assess awareness about basic
cybersecurity practices and the threats in the domain of cybersecurity.
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Table 4.7. Measurement Scale for Cybersecurity Awareness (Manjak, M., 2006)
Measurement Items
CySA1- I am careful when downloading third-party software.
CySA2- I often download from third party websites. (Reversed)
CySA3- My computer often gets infected by viruses. (Reversed)
Cybersecurity
Awareness
(CySA)

CySA4 - I do not use anti-virus software on my computer.
CySA5 - I frequently update the anti-virus software on my
computer.
CySA6 -

I have anti-virus software installed, updated, and enabled

on my computer.
CySA7- I often download and install unlicensed software.
(Reversed)

4.3.9. Check Questions. Check questions were included in the questionnaire to
examine if the subject is attentive in answering the questions presented to them during the
experimental study. The measurement items for the check questions were developed by the
researcher (see Table 4.8). To collect the responses from the subjects and to maintain
consistency with the rest of the questions in the survey, a 7-point Likert scale (strongly
disagree=1 to strongly agree=7) was used.
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Table 4.8. Measurement Scale for Check Questions
Measurement Items
(CHK1) Please check "Strongly Agree".
Check
Questions

(CHK2) Please check "Strongly Disagree".

(CHK)

4.4. PILOT TESTS
Three pilot tests were carried out. The comments from the participants of the first
pilot study were used to revise the experimental conditions and evaluate the measurement
items.

Some of the measurement items and the scenario details were not easily

understandable and were complex, which were rephrased to a more understandable form.
The feedback from the participants of the second pilot study was used to correct the
experimental procedures and the logical flow of the experimental study.
After the third pilot study, the comments from the participants were used to correct
the way in which the measurement items were presented to the subjects, thereby making
the post-study questionnaire more understandable. Since there were many measurement
items, we decided on adding check questions which helped us assess if the subjects were
attentive when responding to the questionnaire.
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5. DATA ANALYSIS
The graduate and undergraduate students from the Business and Information
Technology department of Missouri University of Science and Technology participated in
the experiment. The total number of subjects who participated in the study was 151. After
removing the data points that did not pass the manipulation check questions or the check
questions in the post-study questionnaire, the sample size is 120. The sample for this
experimental study had both male and female subjects who were sourced to participate in
this experimental study through the help of professors of classes and through email contact.
In this chapter, the demographic information of the subjects will be presented and
the reliability and validity of the measurement will be assessed. H1, H3, and H4 will be
assessed using multinomial logistic regression analysis and the chi-square test, as both are
appropriate tests for them. Multinomial logistic regression and Chi-Square tests are
methods used to statistically analyze and predict binary or categorical outcomes. The
difference between these two methods is that the multinomial logistic regression method
predicts the response or dependent variable as binary outcomes, whereas chi-square
method provides the descriptive statistics of the categorical variables. Since the dependent
or response variable is dichotomous (i.e., download or not download), multinomial logistic
regression and chi-square analysis are used to validate the hypotheses H1, H3 and H4. H2
and H5 will be assessed using the univariate analysis of variance method. The univariate
analysis of variance method is used to examine the relationship or interaction existing
between the factors and the dependent variable, i.e., between the two independent
variables, monetary polarity and certainty, and the dependent variable, tipping point.
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5.1. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF SUBJECTS
The demographic information of the subjects is summarized in Table 5.1. The
participants of this experimental study fall in the age group of 18 to 44. The factor analysis,
and the validity and reliability analysis of measurement were also conducted. IBM SPSS
Statistics 11.0 software was utilized to cleanse and analyze the data that was collected
during the experimental study.

Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects
Gender
Male
Female

58.30%
41.70%
Age

18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75 or older

82.50%
11.70%
1.70%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
Race and Ethnicity

White
Black or African American

63.30%
7.50%

American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Hispanic or Latino

0.00%
20.80%
0.80%
4.20%
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Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects (cont)
Other
Prefer Not to Disclose

2.50%
0.80%
Marital Status

Single
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated

89.20%
10.00%
0.00%
0.80%
0.00%
Time Spent Online (Per Week)
1-5 hours
1.70%
6 - 10 hours
11.70%
11-15 hours
17.50%
16-20 hours
24.20%
20+ hours
45.00%
Frequency of Software Download from the Internet?
Rarely Never
48.30%
Once a Month
21.70%
Two or Three Times a Month
18.30%
Four Times or More Than Four Times a Month
11.70%
Major Field of Study
Information Science and Technology

50.00%

Business and Management
Engineering

40.00%
2.50%

Psychology

2.50%

Other (Please Specify)

5.00%
Student Level

Undergraduate Student

79.20%

Graduate Student

19.20%

Certificate-Seeking (only) Student

0.80%

Other (Please Specify)

0.80%

Working (Paid Employee)
Working (Self-Employed)

Employment Status
41.70%
3.30%
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Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects (cont)
Not Working

50.80%

Prefer Not to Disclose
4.20%
Family Income (Previous Year, Before Taxes)
Less than $10,000
10.00%
$10,000 to $49,999

19.20%

$50,000 to $99,999

37.50%

$100,000 to $149,999

20.00%

$150,000 or More

13.30%
Disposable Income (Per Month)

Less Than $100

35.00%

$100 - $500

43.30%

$501 - $1000

10.80%

$1001 - $2000

5.80%

More Than $2000

5.00%

5.2. MEASUREMENT VALIDATION
The convergent and discriminant validity for the measures in the post-study
questionnaire were analyzed using the Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) method. The
values of varimax rotation and principal component analysis of EFA are reported in Table
5.2 and Table 5.3.
A 9 X 9 factorial structure was created consisting of eigenvalues (>1.0). The target
factors were loaded by the respective measurement items in all the cases except the
measurement items for cybersecurity awareness as they are formative unlike other
measures that are reflective.
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Table 5.2. Results of Factor Analysis (with all measurements)
1

2
3
4
TA2
.866
-.044
.028
-.149
TA5
.863
-.078
.033
-.108
TA1
.824
-.225
-.034
.025
TA4
.795
.192
.178
-.128
TA6
.786
-.053
.071
.051
TA3
.658
-.081
-.056
.206
IPC1
-.059
.830
-.061
.218
IPC3
-.056
.797
-.154
.210
IPC4
-.118
.765
.003
.147
IPC6
-.027
.729
-.033
.086
IPC2
-.073
.709
.001
.002
IPC5
-.041
.688
-.220
.305
T3
.064
-.060
.903
-.080
T1
.060
-.090
.880
-.118
T2
.105
-.142
.855
-.161
TS1
-.104
.224
-.143
.842
TS2
-.061
.249
-.070
.826
TS3
.054
.302
-.167
.790
CySA6
-.024
.100
.019
-.009
CySA5
-.100
.140
.001
.012
CySA4
.068
-.009
-.089
-.043
F3
-.006
.029
.006
.149
F1
.128
.111
-.424
.120
F2
.067
.090
-.579
.091
CySA2
.142
.113
-.162
.206
CySA7
.123
.118
-.117
.464
CySA1
-.026
.060
-.199
-.019
CySA3
-.008
.059
-.177
.168
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

5
-.113
-.107
.027
-.026
.050
.094
.010
.099
.094
.135
.108
-.078
-.045
.060
-.071
.004
-.041
.013
.896
.878
.868
-.030
.173
.071
-.044
-.108
.269
.075

6

7

.083
.107
.046
-.030
.133
-.137
.091
-.068
.137
-.025
.097
.163
-.154
-.140
-.109
.088
.190
.157
.036
.059
.009
.779
.700
.641
.517
.508
.484
-.045

.081
.049
.004
-.181
.096
-.083
-.056
-.005
-.214
.477
.479
.184
-.039
-.122
-.181
.063
.113
.054
-.006
.148
.015
-.116
-.102
.020
.385
.348
.423
.752

Legend: TA: Tolerance towards Ad; IPC: Importance of Personal Computers; T: Trust; F:
Fear; CySA: Cybersecurity Awareness
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Table 5.3. Results of Factor Analysis (after removing TA3 and IPC2)
1

2
3
4
TA5
.882
-.083
.021
-.078
TA2
.881
-.050
.016
-.115
TA4
.823
.181
.158
-.077
TA6
.806
-.077
.047
.110
TA1
.805
-.226
-.032
.025
IPC1
-.055
.859
-.046
.186
IPC3
-.066
.808
-.144
.191
IPC4
-.109
.808
.022
.100
IPC5
-.044
.684
-.221
.306
IPC6
-.028
.669
-.055
.141
T3
.071
-.063
.902
-.075
T1
.060
-.089
.883
-.123
T2
.109
-.138
.860
-.170
TS2
-.065
.243
-.078
.842
TS1
-.125
.224
-.143
.841
TS3
.033
.296
-.172
.802
CySA7
.141
.107
-.131
.489
CySA6
-.020
.097
.016
-.006
CySA5
-.107
.134
.001
.010
CySA4
.052
-.019
-.091
-.039
F3
.000
.022
.002
.163
F1
.132
.097
-.435
.148
F2
.085
.083
-.592
.118
CySA3
-.008
.074
-.168
.147
CySA2
.162
.145
-.155
.180
CySA1
-.034
.066
-.188
-.039
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

5
-.091
-.095
-.001
.075
.026
.007
.102
.085
-.073
.161
-.041
.058
-.076
-.035
.005
.019
-.101
.900
.880
.869
-.042
.170
.073
.084
-.049
.260

6

7

.063
.039
-.052
.076
.040
.093
-.062
.158
.131
-.084
-.143
-.110
-.074
.151
.070
.138
.425
.031
.049
.015
.802
.709
.616
-.148
.438
.459

.063
.081
-.208
.069
.021
.020
.014
-.105
.213
.385
-.063
-.135
-.181
.122
.067
.052
.410
.001
.150
.000
-.035
-.049
.083
.782
.530
.498

Legend: TA: Tolerance towards Ad; IPC: Importance of Personal Computers; T: Trust; F:
Fear; CySA: Cybersecurity Awareness
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The measurement items listed in above show good convergent and discriminant
validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979), except in the case of the measurement items TA3 and
IPC2 which did not load as well. As shown in the results of the first factor analysis, IPC2
cross loaded with cybersecurity awareness and TA3 loaded much less on the factor than
the rest of the items. Hence, both items were dropped. The EFA was once again carried
out and the factor analysis. Table 5.3 provided the varimax rotated component matrix of
results of EFA without items TA3 and IPC2.

Table 5.4. Results of Reliability Analysis
Construct

Cronbach’s alpha coefficient

Tolerance Towards Ads (TA)

0.895

Importance of Primary Computers (IPC)

0.862

Trust (T)

0.918

Threat Severity (TS)

0.884

Fear (F)

0.774

Cybersecurity Awareness (CySA)

0.702

After completing the factor analysis of all the measurement items, the reliability
analysis was performed to examine and calculate the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients
(Cronbach, 1951). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 1951) has been used as a
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standard to assess internal consistency or reliability. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
value for the seven factors are provided in Table 5.4.
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of a minimum of 0.70 indicates a good reliability of
the constructs (Nunnally, Bernstein, & Berge, 1967). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients
shown in Table 5.4 are well above 0.7, suggesting that all the measures and their respective
measurement components are reliable.

5.3. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Multinomial Logistic Regression is a method used to statistically analyze and
predict binary outcomes. The binary or categorical outcomes that are predicted using this
method are dichotomous i.e., having only two possible values such as 0’s and 1’s or
Yes/No. Multinomial logistic regression is a method of regression analysis where nominal
outcome variables are modelled. In this type of logistic regression, the log odds of the
variables are modelled as dependent variables, in a linearly combined form.
Multinomial Logistic Regression is used to develop and analyze a model with the
factor and the covariates. Multinomial Logistic Regression is generally applied where the
dependent variables are binary variables like in this case where we analyze whether the
subjects have chosen to download the “Ad-Free Pro” application or not across the
guaranteed gain, guaranteed loss, probable gain, and probable loss conditions. Also, the
covariates include Importance of Primary Computer, Threat Severity, Trust, Fear,
Tolerance towards Ads, and Cyber Security Awareness. We also analyzed the multinomial
logistic regression on the download action for scenarios operationalized using Expected
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Monetary Values $100. The results of the binary logistic regression for expected monetary
value $100 are reported in Table 5.5. The variables represented in following table are:


B. The value of B is the logistic coefficient that represents the relationship

exhibited by the independent variables, Monetary Polarity (Gain vs Loss) and Certainty
(Guaranteed vs Probable).


S.E. The variable S.E. represents Standard Error. The value provided under

the S.E column is used to examine if the value of the parameter is largely different
compared to 0. The t-value is calculated by dividing the parameter estimate by the value
of the standard error. The confidence intervals for the parameters are created based on the
value of the standard errors.


Wald and Sig. The Wald chi-square value and 2-tailed p-value are used to

test if the value of the null hypothesis is 0. For our data analysis, we will compare each
p-value to our preselected alpha threshold of 0.05. Coefficients that have a sig value (pvalue) lesser than the preselected alpha value are considered to be statistically significant
(Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002).


Degree of Freedom (df). The variable, df, represents the degree of freedom

of the coefficients for a particular test.


Exp(B). The odds ratio of the predictor variables is reported under the

Exp(B) column in Table 5.5. The odds ratio is computed by applying the exponentiation
operation on the values of the coefficients. The values show the possibility of a particular
event happening with respect to the reference variable.
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Table 5.5. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis for Expected Monetary
Value of $100

Std.
Download for $100
B
Error
Wald
df Sig. Exp(B)
0 Intercept
-7.928 2.825
7.877
1 .005
Importance of
.496
.341
2.117
1 .146
1.643
Primary
Computer
Threat Severity
.503
.292
2.969
1 .085
1.654
Trust
-.902
.237 14.478
1 .000
.406
Fear
.267
.256
1.085
1 .298
1.306
Tolerance
.278
.248
1.256
1 .262
1.321
towards Ads
Cyber Security
.661
.311
4.521
1 .033
1.936
Awareness
Loss [Monetary -.331
.510
.421
1 .517
.718
Polarity=0]
Gain [Monetary
0b
.
.
0
.
.
Polarity=1]
Probable
-.631
.530
1.420
1 .233
.532
[Certainty=0]
Guaranteed
0b
.
.
0
.
.
[Certainty=1]
a. The reference category is: 1.
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

95% Confidence
Interval for
Exp(B)
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
.842

3.205

.933
.255
.790
.812

2.931
.646
2.156
2.148

1.053

3.560

.264

1.952

.

.

.188

1.503

.

.

Monetary Polarity. From the results of the analysis as shown in Table 5.5, we
found that the variable Loss (p = 0.517) does not show any significant effect in influencing
the outcome to download or not download the software application over the Gain condition.
The p-value is greater than the preselected alpha value of 0.05. Based on the value of
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significance observed in the results of multinomial logistic regression, we conclude that
monetary polarity has no significant effect on users’ risky cybersecurity action. Hence, H1
is not supported.
Certainty. From the results of the analysis, we found that the variable Probable (p
= 0.233) does not show any significant effect influencing the outcome of download or not
download the software application over the Guaranteed condition. The p-value is greater
than the preselected alpha value of 0.05. Based on the value of significance observed in the
results of the analysis, we conclude that there is no significant difference in the effect of
probable and guaranteed conditions on users’ risky cybersecurity behavior.
Importance of Primary Computer (IPC). From the results of the analysis shown
in results of multinomial logistic regression, we found that Importance of Primary
Computer (p = 0.146) does not show any significant effect on the download outcome.
Threat Severity (TS). From the results of the analysis, we found that threat severity
(p = 0.085) does not show any significant effect on the download outcome.
Trust (T). From the results of the analysis, we found that trust (p < 0.05) has a
significant effect on the download outcome. Based on the significance observed in the
analysis, we conclude that the covariate Trust has a significant effect on users’ risky
cybersecurity action.
Fear (F). From the results of the analysis shown in results of the multinomial
logistic regression, we found that fear (p = 0.298) does not show any significant effect on
the download outcome.
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Tolerance towards Ads (TA). From the results of the analysis shown in results of
multinomial logistic regression, we found that Tolerance towards Ads (p = 0.262) does not
show a significant effect on the download outcome.
Cybersecurity Awareness (CySA). From the results of the analysis, we found that
Cybersecurity Awareness (p = 0.033) has a significant effect on the download outcome.
Based on the significance observed in the results from the multinomial logistic regression
analysis, we conclude that the covariate, Cybersecurity Awareness, has a significant effect
on the users’ risky cybersecurity action.
To address H3 and H4, we conduct Multinomial Logistic Regression by assessing
the effect of probable and guaranteed loss conditions on risky cybersecurity behavior
separately from analyzing the effect of probable and guaranteed gain conditions on risky
cybersecurity behavior.
From the results of the analysis as shown in the Table 5.6, we found that the variable
Guaranteed (p = 0.484) does not show any significant effect in influencing the outcome to
download or not download the software application over the Probable condition in a Loss
scenario. The p-value is greater than the preselected alpha value of 0.05 (see Table 5.6).
Based on the value of significance observed in Table 5.6, we conclude that guaranteed
condition has no significant effect on users’ risk-taking action compared to probable
condition in the loss scenario. Hence, H3 is not supported.
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Table 5.6. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis for Expected
Monetary Value of $100 in Loss Conditions

Download for
Std.
a
$100
B
Error Wald
1
Intercept
.208 .373 .309
Loss
0b
.
.
[Monetary
Polarity=0]
Guaranteed
.380 .543 .490
[Certainty=1]
Probable
0b
.
.
[Certainty=0]
a. The reference category is: 0.

df
1
0

Sig.
.578
.

1
0

95% Confidence
Interval for Exp(B)
Lower
Upper
Exp(B) Bound
Bound
.

.

.

.484

1.463

.504

4.240

.

.

.

.

Table 5.7. Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis for Expected Monetary
Value of $100 in Gain Conditions

Download for
$100a
1
Intercept

Std.
B
Error Wald
- .461 7.958
1.299
0b
.
.

Gain
[Monetary
Polarity=1]
Probable
1.471 .572 6.613
[Certainty=0]
Guaranteed
0b
.
.
[Certainty=1]
a. The reference category is: 0.

df

95% Confidence
Interval for Exp(B)
Lower
Upper
Exp(B) Bound
Bound

1

Sig.
.005

0

.

.

.

.

1

.010

4.354

1.419

13.361

0

.

.

.

.
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From the results of the analysis as shown in the Table 5.7, we found that the
variable Probable (p = 0.010) shows a significant effect in influencing the outcome to
download the software application over the Guaranteed condition by 1.471 times in a
Gain scenario, but the observed effect is in the opposite direction as H4. Hence, H4,
which states that users are more willing to engage in risky computer security behavior in
the guaranteed condition compared to the probable condition, H4 is not supported.

5.4. CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS
The Chi-Square test is a statistical method that is used to measure the association
between two or more categorical variables. The null hypothesis of the Chi-Square statistical
test is that there is no existence of any relationship between the categorical variables in the
total sample. The Chi-Square method is widely used by researchers to evaluate the Tests
of Independence when using a crosstabulation. The crosstabulation method is also known
as the bivariate table, as the variables tabulated and compared are categorical. The
crosstabulation or crosstabs method is a tabular distribution of two categorical variables
simultaneously, with the intersections of the categories of the variables appearing in the
cells of the table. The Test of Independence measure assesses if there is any existing
association between the variables by analyzing the pattern of the responses in the cells to
the pattern that would be expected if the variables are truly independent of each other.
We use the Chi-Square statistical method to examine if there is an
interaction between the independent variables (Monetary Polarity and the Certainty) on the
user behavior (Download or Not Download) which is the response variable.
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Table 5.8. Descriptive Statistics of Chi-Square Analysis
Monetary
Polarity
Loss
Certainty

Gain

Total
Certainty

Total

Total
Certainty
Total

Download or Not
Not Download Download
Probable
18 (64.3%)
10 (35.7%)
Guaranteed
16 (55.2%)
13 (44.8%)
34 (59.6%)
23 (40.3%)
Probable
16 (45.7%)
19 (54.3%)
Guaranteed
22 (78.6%)
6 (21.4%)
38 (60.3%)
25 (39.7%)
Probable
34 (54.0%)
29 (46.0%)
Guaranteed
38 (66.7%)
19 (33.3%)
72 (60.0%)
48 (40.0%)

Total
28
29
57
35
28
63
63
57
120

The descriptive statistics from the Chi-Square test shown in Table 5.8 indicate that
23 users (40.3% of those in loss scenario) chose to download the software to avoid a loss
whereas 25 (39.7% of those in gain scenario) users chose to download to receive a gain.
The results of the Chi-Square statistical analysis (see Table 5.9) shows that for the
Loss scenarios, value of chi-square statistic is 0.492 with 1 degree of freedom (df) and with
a p-value of 0.483 (p-value > 0.05), which is not statistically significant. For the Gain
scenarios, (see Table 5.9) the results of the chi-square tests show a value of 7.016 with 1
degree of freedom (df) and with a p-value of 0.08 (p-value > 0.05), which is also not
statistically significant. These results show that there is no relationship between Certainty
and User Download in both the Gain and Loss conditions.
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Table 5.9. Results of Chi-Square Analysis
Asymptotic
Significance Exact Sig.
df
(2-sided)
(2-sided)
1
.483
1
.666

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

Monetary Polarity
Value
Loss Pearson Chi-Square
.492c
Continuity
.186
b
Correction
Likelihood Ratio
.493
1
.483
Fisher's Exact Test
.592
.334
Linear-by-Linear
.483
1
.487
Association
N of Valid Cases
57
Gain Pearson Chi-Square
7.016d
1
.008
Continuity
5.711
1
.017
b
Correction
Likelihood Ratio
7.275
1
.007
Fisher's Exact Test
.010
.008
Linear-by-Linear
6.905
1
.009
Association
N of Valid Cases
63
Total Pearson Chi-Square
2.011a
1
.156
Continuity
1.516
1
.218
b
Correction
Likelihood Ratio
2.021
1
.155
Fisher's Exact Test
.193
.109
Linear-by-Linear
1.994
1
.158
Association
N of Valid Cases
120
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
22.80.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
c. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
11.30.
d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is
11.11.
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Based on the analysis, it is observed that the results from the linear regression
statistical model and the chi-square statistical method are similar. We observe from the
above results that the proposed hypothesis H1, H3 and H4 are not supported in both the
cases. As chi-square is a descriptive test and not a modelling technique, and since we have
explicitly defined a dependent variable (user behavior) for prediction, we consider the
results from logistic regression model to be more appropriate for this study.

5.5. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR TIPPING POINT
The generalized linear model expands the general linear model such that there is a
linear relation established between the dependent variable and the factors and covariates
using a specific link function. The generalized linear model also allows the dependent
variable to have a non-normal distribution. In the univariate analysis of variance
(ANOVA), we compare the difference of the means between the groups. The factors or the
groups in this method refer to the two independent variables used in the univariate analysis.
The main objective of this model is to examine the relationship or an interaction between
the factors and the dependent variable, i.e. between the two independent variables and the
dependent variable. In the data analysis for our experimental study, we use the ANOVA to
compare and analyze the tipping point (the Expected Monetary Value above which subjects
choose to download the “Ad-Free Pro” application).
Since the maximum expected monetary value was set to $100 in the experiment,
we were not able to analyze tipping points that were above $100 and hence, we removed
all the data points with expected monetary value greater than $100 (i.e., we were not able
to determine the tipping point for subjects who indicated that they would not download the
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software in their first scenario that has an expected monetary value of $100). We removed
these data points to avoid making any assumption about their tipping points (since they
were above $100).
Table 5.10 provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, tipping
point, based on the independent variables, Monetary Polarity (Gain and Loss) and Certainty
(Guaranteed and Probable). The variable N represents the number of subjects in a specific
condition. The Mean value shown in Table 5.10 is the average tipping point value in every
condition. Table 5.10 indicates that the mean tipping point of expected monetary value is
$53.50 for the Probable Loss condition, $33.29 for the Probable Gain condition, $13.85 for
the Guaranteed Loss condition, and $14.17 for the Guaranteed Gain condition.

Table 5.10. Descriptive Statistics of the Univariate Analysis of Variance
Dependent Variable: Tipping Point (TP)
Monetary Polarity
Loss

Gain

Total

Certainty
Probable
Loss
Guaranteed
Loss
Total
Probable
Gain
Guaranteed
Gain
Total
Probable
Guaranteed
Total

Mean
53.500

Standard
Deviation
40.9980

13.846

28.2034

13

31.087
33.289

39.0573
37.5560

23
19

14.167

11.5830

6

28.700
40.259
13.947
29.844

33.9893
39.2755
23.8239
36.1307

25
29
19
48

N
10
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Table 5.11 reports the results of the univariate ANOVA. The Sig column provides
the p-value (2-tailed), which is used to assess if the effect by an independent variable or
covariate is significant or not. In this case, we will compare each p-value to our preselected
threshold for alpha value of 0.05. Coefficients having p-values less than this threshold for
alpha value are statistically significant (Peng et al., 2002).

Table 5.11. Results of Tests of Between Subjects Effects for Tipping Point
Dependent Variable: Tipping Point (TP)
Type III Sum of
Source
Squares
Corrected Model
29108.395a
Intercept
4575.395
Importance of Primary
1698.917
Computer
Threat Severity
88.549
Trust
10007.841
Fear
976.114
Tolerance towards Ads
35.471
Cyber Security
216.999
Awareness
Monetary Polarity
323.020
Certainty
5974.018
Monetary Polarity *
371.171
Certainty
Error
32246.684
Total
104106.250
Corrected Total
61355.078
a. R Squared = .474 (Adjusted R Squared = .350)

df
9
1
1

Mean Square
3234.266
4575.395
1698.917

F
3.811
5.392
2.002

Sig.
.002
.026
.165

1
1
1
1
1

88.549
10007.841
976.114
35.471
216.999

.104
11.793
1.150
.042
.256

.748
.001
.290
.839
.616

1
1

323.020
5974.018

1

371.171

38
48
47

848.597

.381 .541
7.040 .01
2
.437 .51
2
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The p-value of the independent variable, Monetary Polarity, on dependent variable,
tipping point, is not significant (p=0.541). However, the p-value of the independent
variable, Certainty, on dependent variable, tipping point, is significant (p=0.012<0.05).
Hence, Certainty has a main effect on the expected monetary value of the tipping point.
Among the covariates, Trust (T) shows a significant effect on the tipping point
value, as it has a p-value (0.001<0.05). Other covariates such as Importance of Primary
Computer (p-value = 0.165), Threat Severity (p-value = 0.748), Fear (p-value = 0.290),
Tolerance towards Ads (p-value=0.839) and Cyber Security Awareness (p-value= 0.616)
do not show any significant effect on the expected monetary value of the tipping point.
Hence, all the covariates except Trust do not have a significant effect on the expected
monetary value of the tipping point.
The results from the ANOVA also indicates that the p-value of the interaction is
0.512, and hence, there is no significant interaction of Monetary Polarity and Certainty on
the expected monetary value of the tipping point. Although there is no significant
interaction found, the independent variable, Certainty, has a significant main effect on the
tipping point value.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the tipping values for all the four conditions involving
Monetary Polarity and Certainty. Monetary polarity is represented on the horizontal axis
and Certainty is plotted as two separate lines, one for the Guaranteed condition and the
other for the Probable condition.
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Figure 5.1. Interaction between Monetary Polarity and Certainty on Tipping Value

There is no significant interaction between Monetary Polarity and Certainty on the
expected monetary value of the Tipping Point. Figure 5.1 shows that the Gain conditions
do not have a higher tipping point of expected monetary value compared to the Loss
conditions.
Based on the values from ANOVA, both the probable conditions (Probable Gain
($33.289) and Probable Loss ($53.500)) have higher expected monetary values of tipping
points compared to the guaranteed conditions (Guaranteed Gain ($14.167) and Guaranteed
Loss ($13.846)), which supports the finding that Certainty has a significant effect on the
expected monetary value of the tipping point (p=0.012<0.05). Hence, H5 is supported.
Table 5.12 provides a summary of the results of hypothesis testing. H1-H4 are not
supported and only H5 is supported. The next chapter discusses the findings.
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Table 5.12. Results of Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis
H1: Users are more willing to engage in risky computer security
behavior to avoid a loss than to receive a gain controlling for the
amount net expected monetary value.

Supported?
No

H2: Users exhibit a higher tipping point of expected monetary value No
to engage in risky computer security behavior when presented with a
condition of experiencing gain compared to the condition of
avoiding a loss.
H3: Users are more willing to engage in risky computer security
behavior to avoid a guaranteed loss than a probable loss when the
amount of expected loss is controlled.

No

H4: Users are more willing to engage in risky computer security
No
behavior to receive a guaranteed gain than a probable gain when the
amount of expected gain is controlled.
H5: Users exhibit a higher tipping point of expected monetary value Yes
to engage in risky computer security behavior when presented with a
probable condition compared to a guaranteed condition in scenarios
involving monetary gains or losses.
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6. DISCUSSIONS
In line with prospect theory, the findings suggest that users in probable conditions
will engage in risky cybersecurity activities at a higher tipping point of expected monetary
value as compared to users in guaranteed conditions, regardless of whether it is a gain or
loss scenario. In other words, users are more likely to engage in risky cybersecurity actions
to receive a guaranteed gain or to avoid a guaranteed loss than to receive a probable gain
or to avoid a probable loss when the amount of expected monetary value is controlled.
Hence, providing a guaranteed gain or avoiding a guaranteed loss is more likely to lead
users to take risky cybersecurity actions when compared to their equivalent probable
conditions (i.e., that controlled for expected monetary values). In a gain scenario, users
need to be rewarded with a higher value of expected monetary gain in a probable condition
than a guaranteed condition in order to engage in risky cybersecurity behavior. Similarly,
in a loss avoidance scenario, users expect a higher value of expected monetary loss
avoidance in a probable condition than a guaranteed condition in order to engage in risky
cybersecurity behavior.
Furthermore, the findings from our study also show that monetary polarity has no
significant impact on users to partake a risky cyber security activity, while trust and
cybersecurity awareness have a significant effect on users’ decisions to take risky
cybersecurity actions.
The results of the data analysis based on the hypotheses are summarized and
discussed below:
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First, there is no difference in users’ risky computer security behavior when
avoiding a loss or receiving a gain, which is not in line with prospect theory. We believe
that human decision-making and behavior may be moderated by the way choices are
presented to them. It is possible that prospect theory applies when individuals have to
make a choice between different levels of risks or uncertainties but may not apply to
accepting or rejecting a choice made under pre-determined scenarios of risks. Future
research can explore this possibility in the application of prospect theory
Second, there is no difference in the tipping point of expected monetary value in
the loss and gain conditions. Hence, the principle of loss aversion in prospect theory was
not observed and people do not seem to value losses and gains differently when facing
risky cybersecurity decisions.
Third, there is no difference in users’ risky computer security behavior in a
guaranteed and probable gain conditions. Similarly, there is also no difference in users’
risky computer security behavior in a guaranteed and probable gain conditions.
Lastly, users are more willing to engage in risky computer security behavior at a
higher tipping point of expected monetary value in the probable conditions compared to
the guaranteed conditions in both gain and loss scenarios. The reason is that users prefer
to receive a guaranteed gain or avoid a guaranteed loss as compared to their probable
equivalent of expected value of the gain or loss. In line with prospect theory, a guaranteed
gain is preferred to a probable gain with expected value controlled (risk aversion or
certainty effect) and hence, the tipping point for guaranteed gains is lower than that for
probable gains. Based on prospect theory, a probable loss is generally preferred to a
guaranteed loss due to a preference for risk-seeking behavior when dealing with losses.
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Hence, users are more interested to avoid a guaranteed loss as compared to avoiding
a probable loss, with expected value being controlled. As such, the tipping point for
avoiding a guaranteed loss is lower than the tipping point for avoiding a probable loss of
the same expected value.
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7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This research study had some limitations that can be resolved in the future research.
To carry out the study in a controlled environment, the experiment was conducted in the
computer labs of the Missouri University of Science and Technology, which we see as our
first limitation. This was done to ensure that students were focused and not distracted by
people or objects in the surrounding or environment. Hence, they could not use their laptop
computers or their primary desktop computers to take part in the experiment. In future
research, we would like subjects to participate in the experimental study using their primary
personal computer or laptop. By using the above-mentioned procedure, we could analyze
the cyber security behavior of users and their willingness to take risky cyber security
actions on their primary personal computer or laptop.
Second, the experiment did not simulate any actual uncertified software download
on the subjects’ computers which could have made the experimental scenario more
realistic. This can be overcome in future research by simulating an uncertified software
download on the subjects’ computers before presenting the experimental conditions.
Third, students who participated in the study mentioned in their suggestions that
the number of conditions in the repeated measure of the experiment (i.e., varying expected
monetary values) could be reduced. The subjects were presented with up to nine expected
monetary value conditions based on their decisions to download the software from the
uncertified developer to examine their tipping point for taking risky cyber security
behavior. Future studies can overcome this limitation by increasing the starting value and
the interval of the expected monetary value.
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Lastly, we captured and analyzed very few perceptual outcomes such as Importance
of Primary Computer, Threat Severity, Trust, Fear, Tolerance towards Ads, and Cyber
Security Awareness as covariates. In future research, other covariates such as confidence
of action of users, perceived severity, perceived risk, and other personality traits could be
studied. The cybersecurity awareness measurement was more formative, than reflective,
since they were based mostly on outcomes of cybersecurity actions and cybersecurity
policies. Future studies can include more reflective measurement items for examining the
cybersecurity awareness of users.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
This research examines the impact of guaranteed and probable monetary gains and
losses on the cybersecurity behavior of users using an experimental study.

It also

investigates the expected monetary value of the tipping point (minimum value for the user
to take a risky cyber security action) of users in the guaranteed gain, probable gain,
guaranteed loss, and probable loss conditions. It examines the effect of various user traits
and perceptions, i.e., importance of primary computer, threat severity, trust, fear, tolerance
towards ads, and cybersecurity awareness, as covariates in the study.
This study focuses on understanding the willingness of users to take risky
cybersecurity actions to avoid a monetary loss as compared to receiving a monetary gain
based on the prospect theory. The findings suggest that the loss condition does not affect
users’ software download decisions differently from the gain condition.
This research study also focuses on understanding the willingness of users to take
risky cyber security actions when presented with guaranteed and probable monetary loss
conditions. The findings suggest that the guaranteed loss and probable loss conditions have
a similar effect on users’ risky cybersecurity actions.
This research study also focuses on analyzing the willingness of users to take risky
cyber security actions when presented with guaranteed and probable monetary gain
conditions. The findings suggest that the guaranteed gains and probable gain conditions
do not differ in their impact on the users’ decision to take risky cyber security actions.
Based on the value function explained in the prospect theory, this experimental
study focuses on examining whether users show a higher tipping point of expected
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monetary value in the loss condition compared to the gain condition. It also focuses on
understanding whether users show a higher expected monetary value of tipping point in
the probable condition compared to the guaranteed condition in both gain and loss
scenarios. The findings of this research suggest that the loss conditions do not have a
significant effect on the expected monetary value of tipping point compared to the gain
conditions. The findings also suggest that the probable conditions show a significant effect
on users to have a higher expected monetary value of tipping point compared to the
guaranteed conditions.
Moreover, the results of this study can help in predicting users’ cybersecurity
behavior based on guaranteed and probable monetary gains and losses. The results of this
research provide an understanding about the tipping point of users which can be used to
design effective spam filters to restrict phishing emails and other cybersecurity threats. The
findings from this research study can also be used to warn and train employees about
avoiding phishing emails and thereby preventing employees from taking risky cyber
security actions for monetary gains and losses.
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APPENDIX A
SCENARIO DETAILS
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
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SCENARIO 1: GUARANTEED GAIN
1.1. Guaranteed Gain with $100 Expected Monetary Value
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SCENARIO 2: GUARANTEED LOSS
2.1 Guaranteed Loss with $100 Expected Monetary Value
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SCENARIO 3: PROBABLE GAIN
3.1. Probable Gain with $200 Expected Monetary Value
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SCENARIO 4: PROBABLE LOSS
4.1. Probable Loss with $200 Expected Monetary Value
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APPENDIX C
MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONS
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1. Gain Conditions (In both Guaranteed and Probable)
1.1. In the scenarios above, on downloading the "Ad-Free Pro" software, you
experience a _________.
1.2.In the scenarios above, on downloading the software, what are your chances of
experiencing a gain/loss?

2. Loss Conditions (In both Guaranteed and Probable)
a. In the scenarios above, on not downloading the "Ad-Free Pro" software,
you experience a ________.
b. In the scenarios above, on not downloading the software, what are your
chances of experiencing a gain/loss?
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APPENDIX D
CONTROL CONDITION
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1. Guaranteed Gain
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2. Guaranteed Loss
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3. Probable Gain
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4. Probable Loss
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APPENDIX E
QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS PERCEPTUAL OUTCOMES
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Measurement of Perceptual Outcomes
Measurement Items
(IPC1) I have important files stored on my primary computer.
Importance of
Primary
Computer
(IPC)

(IPC2) My primary computer is valuable to me.
(IPC3) The data on my primary computer is important to me.
(IPC4) I cannot afford to lose the files on my primary computer.
(IPC5) I will not risk the security of my primary computer.
(IPC6) My primary computer is very important to me.
(TS1) If my computer were infected by malware because of
downloading the "Ad-Free Pro" application, it would be severe.
(TS2) If my computer were infected by malware because of

Threat Severity
downloading the "Ad-Free Pro" application, it
(TS)
(Johnston &
would be serious.
Warkentin, 2010)
(TS3) If my computer were infected by malware because of
downloading the "Ad-Free Pro" application, it
would be significant.
(T1) I believe the "Ad-Free Pro" application is a trustworthy
application.
Trust (T)
(Freed, 2014)

(T2) I trust the vendor of the "Ad-Free Pro" application.
(T3) I trust the "Ad-Free Pro" application.
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(F1) I was worried about downloading the “Ad-Free Pro”
application.
Fear (F)
(Freed, 2014)

(F2) I was concerned about downloading the “Ad-Free Pro”
application.
(F3) I experienced fear when deciding if I should download the “AdFree Pro” application.
(TA1) I hate having ads on my primary computer.
(TA2) Having ads on my primary computer is fine with me.
(TA3) I am bothered by ads on my primary computer.

Tolerance
towards Ads
(TA)

(TA4) I like to have ads on my primary computer.
(TA5) I do not mind having ads on my primary computer.
(TA6) I do not want ads on my primary computer.
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APPENDIX F
QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS DEMOGRAPHICS INFORMATION
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1. Gender - What is your gender? (Male, Female)
2. Age - How old are you? (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74 and, 75 or older)
3. Please specify your ethnicity. (White, Black or African American, American Indian
or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Hispanic or Latino,
Other, Prefer Not to Disclose)
4. What is your marital status? (Single, Married, Widowed, Divorced, Separated)
5. How many hours do you spend online per week approximately? ( 1-5, 6-10, 11-15,
16-20, 20+)
6. How often do you download software from the internet? (Rarely or Never, Once a
Month, Two or Three Times a Month, Four or More Than Four Times a Month)
7. What is your major field of study? (Information Science & Technology, Business
Management, Engineering, Pyschology, Other)
8. Are you an undergraduate student, graduate student or a certificate-seeking (only)
student? (Undergraduate Student, Graduate Student, Certificate-Seeking, Other)
9. What statement best describes your current employment status? (Working (Paid
Employee), Working (Self-employed), Not Working, Prefer Not to Disclose)
10. Please indicate the answer that includes your entire family income in (previous year)
before taxes. (Less than $10,000, $10,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $99,999, $100,000
to $149,999, $150,000 or more)
11. How much disposable income or allowance (i.e., the money you can spend as you
want and not the money you spend on taxes, food, shelter and other basic needs) do
you have per month? (Less than $100, $100 - $500, $501 - $1000, $1001 - $2000,
More than $2000)
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APPENDIX G
QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS USERS’ CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS
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1. I am careful when downloading third-party software.
2. I often download from third party websites.
3. My computer often gets infected by viruses.
4. I do not use anti-virus software on my computer.
5. I frequently update the anti-virus software on my computer.
6. I have anti-virus software installed, updated, and enabled on my computer.
7. I often download and install unlicensed software.
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